---
title: "Report abuse"
description: "Send an authenticated abuse report with the RP attestation and a signed report JWS, and understand standing, protective suspension and cases."
image: "https://docs.agentregistrar.dev/og/docs-default.png"
---

> Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.agentregistrar.dev/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Report abuse

**Goal:** report a compromised or abusive agent sub-identity to the broker with an
authenticated, attributable request so it can open a case and, where warranted,
apply a protective suspension pending review.

This is Contract D.2. It is an identity action, not a billing dispute process and
not a way to delete your account. Reporting a bad provider is a separate,
portal-only human path.

## When to report

- The agent is compromised and is acting outside its owner's intent.
- The agent is using your service for fraud, cryptomining, spam or other abusive
  resource use.
- A chargeback or legal notice points at a specific agent identity.
- You need the broker to consider a protective suspension while you investigate.

Do not use it for ordinary support, a failed payment, a normal account
cancellation or a disagreement about your product.

## Request shape

`POST /api/broker/report-abuse` accepts exactly:

```json
{
  "rp_attestation": "<compact provider attestation JWS>",
  "report": "<compact report JWS>"
}
```

The `report` header is `{"alg":"EdDSA","typ":"agent-rp-abuse+jwt","kid":"<rp key>"}`.
Its claims are:

| Claim | Required | Meaning |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| `iss` | yes | Your RP origin. It must equal the attestation `rp.origin`. |
| `aud` | yes | The human broker origin, for example `https://agentregistrar.dev`. |
| `jti` | yes | `abr_` + 26-character lowercase Crockford base32 ULID. |
| `iat`, `exp` | yes | `exp - iat` is exactly 300 seconds. This is a current event, not a receipt. |
| `agent_id` | yes | The agent sub-identity id from the assertion or receipt. |
| `reason` | yes | 1-500 characters, factual. |
| `evidence` | no | Optional `{assertion_jti, signup_token_jti}`. |

The signing key must be in the attached attestation `keys[]` with `abuse` in its
purposes. The attestation must be **current at report time**, within the standard
60-second skew. Expiry is the primary bound, and the report's own five-minute
window is never extended.

## Broker checks

The broker applies the full Contract G verification to `rp_attestation`:

1. Parse the JWS; require `typ`, `alg: EdDSA`, and exactly one `kid`.
2. Check `iss` against the **broker's** trusted RP-broker list before any JWKS
   fetch. A human's `distrust` does not suppress abuse evidence; D.2 has no human
   session.
3. Verify against the RP broker's JWKS and check `iat`/`exp` with 60 seconds of
   skew.
4. Require `rp.origin` and `rp.audience` to match the discovery binding recorded
   for the provider.
5. Verify the report signature with the named key, then check `iss`/`aud` and the
   report freshness.

There is no status-endpoint call and no discovery fetch in this path. A transient
JWKS/metadata outage is `503` with `rp_broker_unavailable` (retryable), not an
authentication failure.

## Verified versus unverified standing

| Condition | `verification_status` | Effect |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Linked signup with `proof_source` `rp_callback` or `rp_signed`, and a verified attestation | `verified` | Opens a case and may apply a protective suspension pending operator review. |
| No linked signup, `agent_self_reported`, or `legacy_broker_signed` link | `unverified` | Opens a case; does **not** suspend. |
| Missing, expired, invalid, untrusted, or unavailable attestation | rejected | No case; fix the credential or retry a transient failure. |

A protective suspension is not an adjudication. The operator reviews the case and
can restore the agent. The human owner cannot clear a suspension with the
ordinary kill switch; a suspension is operator-only to restore.

## Responses

A new accepted report returns `202`:

```json
{
  "case_id": "0d5f6a7c-...",
  "report_jti": "abr_01j...",
  "verification_status": "verified",
  "deduplicated": false,
  "agent_suspended": true,
  "human_notified": true
}
```

A duplicate `jti` with the same body returns `200` with the same `case_id` and
`deduplicated: true`. A same-`jti`/different-body replay is `409`. A legacy
unauthenticated body is:

```text
HTTP 401
{"error":"unauthorized","error_description":"...","code":"unauthenticated_report"}
```

Other errors use `{error, error_description, code}`. The body limit is 64 KiB and
the endpoint is rate-limited to 60 requests per minute per IP; excess requests
get `429 rate_limited`. Every accepted report opens a case; the response never
includes key material or internal paths.

## What the broker does

- Verifies the RP identity and the report signature.
- Resolves the linked signup and records `verified` or `unverified` standing.
- Opens an abuse case and an operator notification.
- For a verified, receipt-linked report, may apply a protective suspension
  pending operator review and notify the human owner.
- Keeps the evidence and the case timeline.

## What the broker does not do

- It does not adjudicate the dispute, decide who is right, issue refunds, or
  reverse your account action.
- It does not delete the account you created or the resources the agent
  provisioned.
- It does not guarantee that an in-flight assertion is rejected; assertions are
  short-lived and revocation/suspension is enforced at minting time.
- It does not suspend on an unverified or unlinked report.
- It does not expose a report-status call in v1.2.

Your own termination, credential rotation and data-retention policy still apply.

## Human report about a provider

A human who wants to report a bad provider uses the portal, not this endpoint:
`POST /api/broker/report-provider` is session-authenticated, 16 KiB, and takes
the RP origin, audience, optional attestation `jti`, reason, optional evidence,
and optional `distrust_broker`/`block_provider` flags. It opens a provider case
and can update that human's trust/policy. It does not change the provider's
attestation or adjudicate a dispute.

## Evidence and privacy

Include the minimum needed to identify the event:

- the agent id, your account id and the relevant timestamps;
- the assertion or receipt `jti` as evidence;
- a factual reason with no speculation about the human.

Do not send credentials, full request bodies, payment data or personal data
beyond what the report requires. Do not paste secrets into the reason field.

## Safety

- Report one agent per request. Do not use the endpoint as a bulk messaging
  channel.
- Do not automate retaliation against an agent or its owner.
- If you need a provider-wide block, use your own access controls; the broker
  suspends or revokes identities, not your accounts.
- Keep a monitored abuse contact in discovery and in your context guide.

## Verify your work

- [ ] The request is exactly `{rp_attestation, report}`; there is no
      `reporter_service` or unsigned body.
- [ ] The report key is in the attestation with `abuse` purpose and the
      attestation is current at report time.
- [ ] `iss` is your origin, `aud` is the broker, and `exp - iat` is 300 seconds.
- [ ] The agent id and any evidence JTI come from a real assertion or receipt.
- [ ] You understand verified standing, unverified cases, and protective rather
      than immediate/adjudicated suspension.
- [ ] Your own incident steps (disable, rotate, preserve evidence) are recorded.

## Next

- [Production checklist](/providers/guides/production-checklist/): incidents, keys and contacts.
- [Liability and ToS](/providers/concepts/liability-and-tos/): attribution and retention.
- [Trust and limits](/start/trust-and-limits/): what suspension and revocation do and do not do.
- [Specification](/agent-identity/v1/specification/): the normative D.2 rules.

Source: https://docs.agentregistrar.dev/providers/guides/abuse-reporting/index.mdx